

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WINSTON WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM L. MUNIZ, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-00098-JST (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison ("SVSP"), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's original complaint and first amended complaint were dismissed with leave to amend and he has filed a second amended complaint ("SAC"), which is now before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the

statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to provide adequate medical care for his shoulder injury, which included a torn rotator cuff and joint arthritis. The injury caused him progressively worsening pain and prevented him from using his shoulder in a normal fashion. When liberally construed, the allegations state a cognizable claim that medical staff defendants L. Gamboa, J. Chudy, P. Chang, and K. Kumar were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff also asserts a supervisory liability claim against SVSP warden William Muniz. There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may be imposed on an individual defendant only if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. See Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In other words, a

supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Plaintiff has failed to provide factual allegations regarding Warden Muniz's involvement in the deprivation of his constitutional rights that are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff's claim against defendant Muniz is therefore DISMISSED. Dismissal is without leave to amend because plaintiff has been given an opportunity to amend this claim and it appears that further amendment would be futile.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

1. Plaintiff's SAC states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs as against L. Gamboa, J. Chudy, P. Chang, and K. Kumar. The Clerk shall terminate William Muniz as a defendant from the docket in this action.

2. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the SAC (ECF No. 20), and a copy of this order upon Dr. L. Gamboa, Dr. J. Chudy, Dr. P. Chang, and K. Kumar (Chief Medical Executive) at **Salinas Valley State Prison**. The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of the SAC and this order to the California Attorney General's Office.

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than **91 days** from the date this order is filed, defendants must file and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).¹

¹ If defendants assert that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held

1 If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment,
2 defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due.

3 b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion
4 must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than **28 days** from the date the
5 motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment
6 provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment.

7 c. Defendants **shall** file a reply brief no later than **14 days** after the date the
8 opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No
9 hearing will be held on the motion.

10 4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
11 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must
12 do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be
13 granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about
14 any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is
15 entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing
16 makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn
17 testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out
18 specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents,
19 as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants' declarations and
20 documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit
21 your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you.
22 If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v.
23 Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

24 (The Rand notice above does not excuse defendants' obligation to serve said notice again
25 concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).


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27 that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
28 should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Such a motion should
also incorporate a modified Wyatt notice in light of Albino. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d
1108, 1120, n.14 (9th Cir. 2003); Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012).

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

8. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

19 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**


JON S. TIGAR
United States District Judge